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Abstract:  
One feature common to many post-socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage 
structure in the state owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak 
incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the 
entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labor force works in the state sector. We explore 
firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labor practices and outcomes, in a transition 
setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi 
Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to foreign 
invested privately owned firms. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their 
wage policies result in flatter wage – experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work 
force is in greater need for formal training, a need that is, in part, met through direct government 
financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to 
inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labor productivity. 
The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The 
internal labor practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit-maximizing firms 
operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that 
exhibit much more idiosyncratic behavior and whose labor practices are often indistinguishable from state 
firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of ongoing research yet we conjecture that various private 
sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role. 
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I. Introduction 
 
  Numerous studies have noted inefficient labor practices in the state owned sector in various 
transition economies. Such practices include the hoarding of surplus labor and the payment of wages in 
excess of the market wage (see Basu et al. (2000), Lee (1999), Mickiewicz and Bishop (2003)). Yet 
relatively few studies have looked at the incentives that workers face within state firms and how these 
incentives might differ from the private sector. This paper will explore the presence and consequence of 
one such group of incentives deriving from the compressed state sector wage structure. In the compressed 
wage environment of state firms, the returns to worker education and experience levels are lower in state 
enterprises than those typically found for private sector workers. In addition, the within education or 
experience group wage variation also tends to be lower. This wage compression arises from the socialist 
legacy of transition economies, where SOEs have long labored under the fixed wage schedules imposed 
on them through government regulations. 
  The lack of a skilled state sector labor force is another feature often mentioned in discussions of 
the problems facing transition economies. Jefferson (1999) ascribes the low degree of skill in the state 
sector to the lack of a market for labor quality under state socialism. He argues that only after the 
reassignment of property rights during transition did managers have an incentive to develop worker 
quality. This indeed has been the record in Eastern Europe where one key consequence of increased state 
enterprise autonomy has been the delinking of wages from the state mandated wage schedules (Munich et 
al., 1999). SOE managers were then able to align work incentives to better reflect the human capital 
requirements of the firm. The transition experience elsewhere, including Vietnam, is similar. Historically, 
Vietnamese state firms were beholden to fixed wage schedules and while labor market reforms have 
weaned most SOEs from the strict wage schedules, the legacy and influence of such schedules persist to 
at least the late 1990s (Goodkind et al., 1999). 
  This paper attempts to link these two aspects of the state sector – a compressed wage environment 
and a low skilled labor force – by combining two well established strands of the labor economic literature, 
namely the (largely empirical) literature on worker training and the (largely theoretical) literature on 
incentive provisions within firms. In the framework developed in this paper, a compressed wage structure 
provides relatively little incentive for worker effort and, in turn, these lower effort levels partially explain 
the lower labor productivity of SOEs. Another consequence of a compressed wage distribution is reduced 
incentives for workers to invest in on-the-job human capital. This second consequence of compressed 
wages, if it occurs in a work environment that requires repeated investments in human capital, can result 
in a less skilled labor force thus having negative long term consequences for the transition economy as a   
whole. This paper will explore with recent manufacturing firm and worker data from Vietnam how firm 
ownership form affects the internal firm practices that encourage or discourage worker skill acquisition. 
The next section will discuss in more detail the worker skill and productivity consequences from 
the differing wage policies of state and private firms. Yet the reality can be more complicated then a 
simple story of low powered incentives and low skill acquisition in the state sector since subsidized 
formal training opportunities may be relatively abundant in that sector. The extent to which training 
opportunities exist in the Vietnamese state sector, as well as within-firm incentives and worker outcomes, 
is explored in the empirical results of Section IV. Before that, however, is a section (Section III) that 
presents an overview of the transition in Vietnam and discusses the data used in the analysis. Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. Firm Wage Policies and the Implications for Worker Skill Acquisition 
 
State ownership and state residual control rights of the firm can have direct consequences for 
worker incentives through political constraints placed on the labor contracting process. These modified 
labor contracts can in turn affect either investment in human capital, and hence worker skill, or affect 
work effort- and if effort has a learning-by-doing component then worker skills are still affected. Previous 
theoretical work on state firms, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1994) or Prasnikar et al. (1994), views SOE 
behavior as determined through a bargaining process between profit minded managers and ideologically 
driven or constituency minded politicians (and/or the firm’s own workers). This bargaining allows 
political concerns to influence firm behavior including SOE labor market practices. One example of this 
approach is that the principal in this bargaining problem, i.e. the politician, stipulates that firms follow 
official wage schedules that, as a result, reduce intrafirm inequality. This results from the interest of the 
ideology driven politician and may also be demanded by a portion of the firm’s own workforce or other 
members of the general public. Thus political control of firm level variables enabled under state socialism 
results in a more compressed wage structure than what would be observed by private ownership. In return 
the firm receives access to state credit or other sources of support, a portion of which can be spent on 
worker training in an attempt to offset any disincentives for skill acquisition. The extent to which state 
subsidies are spent on training (and the efficacy of such training) is an empirical question. 
The section discusses the consequences of the labor contract reached between firm managers and 
workers given the constraints, if any, created by the bargaining process between managers and the state. 
We can derive the optimal labor contract with a straightforward principal-agent (i.e. manager-worker) 
model of on-the-job human capital investment conducted in a repeated game environment of multi-period   
investment decisions.
1 This approach is also consistent with the view that effort has a learning-by-doing 
effect and the optimal contract aims to induce maximal effort. 
In each period, the agent (worker) chooses to make a skill investment that is both costly for the 
worker and not observable by the principal (the manager). The manager does observe the work outcome 
affected by the investment efforts. For convenience the work outcome is modeled as a 
successful/unsuccessful binary outcome although the results are fully generalizable to wider settings. The 
particular work outcome depends on the total sum of investments over time where the greater the total 
skill level of the worker, the more probable the successful work outcome. It is straightforward to show 
that the optimal contract sets the wage to be dependent on the observed work outcome. Hence the contract 
in any period offers two wages: a low wage corresponding to an unsuccessful outcome, and a high wage 
corresponding to a successful one. The greater the difference between the two wages in the contract, the 
greater the incentive for worker investment and hence the more effort a worker will expend and/or the 
more skills learned. Firms with greater internal wage compression will witness smaller investments in 
human capital or lower effort since the optimal investment level is an increasing function of the 
contractual wage spread.
2 
Over repeated periods, the mean skill level of workers in firms that offer a large wage spread will 
begin to diverge from the lower skill levels in firms that offer a smaller wage spread. In a mixed economy 
of state and private firms, the contracts with the greatest wage differences will be offered by private firms, 
i.e. private firms will offer as great a wage difference as is economically feasible given out-of-firm 
worker alternatives in order to induce maximal effort and learning. On the other hand SOEs, as a result of 
politician and manager bargaining will offer a labor contract with a smaller wage spread. The 
consequences of this lower variation in wages will be less informal learning and worker effort. 
  The reality of firm incentives and worker learning is more complicated then the scenario sketched 
above since there are two ways for workers to acquire skills while on the job. Workers can acquire skills 
informally, through learning-by-doing and learning-from-others, or through formal training programs 
either sponsored by the firm or initiated by the worker herself. Firms can either provide wage incentives 
to encourage learning and skill investment and/or firms can choose to actively train workers in a formal 
setting. Normally, we envision firms freely able to mix and match human resource strategies to suit their 
needs although, presumably, wage incentives are needed more when training is worker financed. 
However in transition economies, state firms may not be completely free to choose training policies since 
                                                 
1 Further theoretical details and a model can be obtained from the author of this study. Kwon (2003) presents a 
similar model when investigating firm incentives for skill acquisition in a large U.S. insurance firm. 
 
2 If there are decreasing marginal returns to worker skill investments then higher promotion premiums are needed at 
more senior job levels in order to induce long tenure workers to continue to invest in skills. This general pattern of 
compensation has been noted in developed economies by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994).   
many have inherited labor practices from pre-transition periods that limit incentives for informal learning. 
On the other hand, SOEs may receive state subsidies in return for their less than optimal labor allocation 
and wage setting practices. Typically government intervention in firm practices is often compensated 
through state support of one type or another (i.e. what Kornai (1979) has dubbed the “soft budget 
constraint”). These funds can in part be spent on worker training programs. Thus the actual stock of 
worker human capital in SOEs, and the efficacy of the state labor force, depends then on the degree of 
intra-firm wage compression, the availability of transfer funds from the central treasury, and the decisions 
of the firm as to how to spend those funds (or the ministerial stipulations guiding the use of those funds). 
  The use of state funds for general formal training may be particularly appealing for SOEs. 
General training, by definition, imparts skills that the worker can utilize to enhance productivity at any 
and every firm. In competitive labor markets, the benefits from such increased labor productivity would 
accrue solely to the worker. However general training has often been observed in advanced economies 
and Acemoglu (1997) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) explore why firms would provide workers with 
general training. They suggest that labor market imperfections, specifically the ability of the firm to claim 
a portion of the worker’s marginal product, due to the existence of asymmetric information or search 
costs, induces the firm to train workers. In essence, firms train workers so that they may maximize their 
own economic rents. From this viewpoint a compressed wage structure, although a disincentive for 
workers to invest in human capital, enhances incentives for firms to invest in worker training (at least for 
more skilled or educated workers). State firms earn greater rents on skilled workers than private sector 
counterparts since wages are more compressed and as such can claim even more residual benefits from an 
increase in worker skills. If state firms receive subsidies earmarked for that purpose then even better. 
Thus a compressed wage structure does not automatically condemn the state sector to a less skilled labor 
force. 
  Besides formal training, another factor that complicates any investigation of the effects of 
contract incentives on (unobservable) worker effort or investment is the issue of worker sorting. In a 
mobile labor market, workers have the flexibility to choose jobs they find most suitable. For example, the 
very risk averse may prefer to remain in a firm with a compressed wage structure while those who believe 
they are high ability workers may seek the challenge of a more competitive work environment. Given this 
possibility, it is difficult to determine empirically whether the superior labor performance of private firms 
is due to incentives that encourage worker learning or to the possibility that workers of higher ability 
select into the higher wage variance environment of the private sector. The data requirements needed to 
distinguish between these two cases include information on worker turnover and measures of individual   
productivity over time. Unfortunately this study lacks such information although it will be able to bring 
indirect evidence to bear on the importance of worker selection.
3 
The empirical section of this paper will explore variation of within-firm worker incentives for 
human capital acquisition across various sectors of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, as well as 
investigate the potential consequences of such incentives. The three general ownership categories 
considered are the Vietnamese state owned sector and two types of private firms: the Vietnamese de novo 
private sector and the foreign-invested joint venture sector. These two private firm types are quite 
different across various important dimensions such as access to formal sources of capital or managerial 
background and will consequently be kept separate in the empirical analysis. Differences not only 
between SOEs and private firms but also among the two types of private firms will be explored and 
discussed. 
The direction of empirical inquiry includes the following: 
 
1.  Since the firm’s labor force has been subjected to this contractual arrangement over multiple periods, 
the observed wage variation in private firms should be greater than in state firms if indeed private 
firms offer a higher a greater contractual wage spread over repeated periods of contracting. This 
variation should hold true both overall and within observable worker categories such as education and 
experience groups. 
2.  If the wage distribution in a state firm is artificially compressed, this might affect the firm’s choice of 
other internal labor practices. Results of a compressed wage structure and reliance on a state wage 
schedule may include a de-emphasis of labor quality as a means for wage determination and job 
advancement in the state firm. State firms may also be more permissive in the time new workers 
spend learning on the job if there was no real imperative for rapid learning in the pre-transition period. 
We will examine these themes empirically. 
3.  The wage-experience profile should be steeper in private firms than in state firms as private sector 
workers are repeatedly offered contracts with a greater wage spread than state sector workers are. The 
cumulative result of these contracts will be steeper mean wage-experience profiles as well as greater 
within firm wage variance among more experienced workers. In addition to differing wage-
experience profiles, if there are complementarities between formal schooling and on-the-job training 
                                                 
3 At least in certain settings these selection issues are not trivial. Lazear (2000) follows the impacts of a change in 
wage policy at a US firm as it switches from salary to piece rate compensation. Lazear ascribes about half of the 
resulting productivity gain to the pure impact of incentives and half to worker turnover (selection). In a transition 
context, we might expect workers that voluntarily exit the state sector to be younger, of greater ability, or less risk 
averse (see Gordon and Li, 1999).   
(as has been suggested in research as far back as Mincer (1962)) then the model will predict lower 
returns to schooling in the state sector. 
4.  Managerial interest in training the workforce will tend to be greater in SOEs than their private sector 
counterparts if SOE workers develop fewer on-the-job skills as a result of weaker within firm 
incentives. This need for formal training may be alleviated through training programs funded by 
official state transfers. Thus we would expect to observe SOE managers to state a greater need for 
workforce formal training as well as perhaps observe a greater incidence of formal training in SOEs. 
In addition, if formal training is a more important mechanism for skill acquisition in the state 
workforce, wages may be more responsive to formal training for state sector than private workers. 
5.  With appropriate controls for firm level information such as firm capital, firm age, and industry, the 
higher skill and effort levels found in private firms should translate into higher estimated levels of 
labor productivity. 
All of these possibilities mentioned above will be investigated in the empirical analysis presented in 
Section IV. Before that, however, the next section will discuss some salient aspects of the Vietnamese 
transition. 
 
III. The Vietnamese Transition and the Vietnamese Data 
 
  Starting in 1954 in the north of Vietnam, and 1975 in the south, Vietnam utilized a planned 
economic system based on the Soviet model. This system, characterized by agricultural collectivization 
and an emphasis on investment in heavy industry, failed to achieve the high levels of growth hoped for 
after national reunification and was adversely affected by the cessation of Soviet subsidies (Fforde and 
DeVylder, 1996). Increased calls for economic reform were first raised in 1981 and eventually resulted in 
a spate of reforms collectively known as Doi Moi. These reforms included the liberalization of the price 
system and the decollectivization of agriculture. Another main branch of reform, enterprise reform, 
resulted in three main ownership categories for firms operating in Vietnam: SOEs, de novo private firms, 
and foreign joint ventures.
4 
  Various SOE reforms included the elimination of direct government subsidies, increased 
managerial autonomy over firm policies, and increased competition among firms by removing restrictions 
on inter-provincial trade. The state also undertook nascent attempts to equitize smaller and less strategic 
                                                 
4 In fact there are numerous ownership categories in Vietnam which fall under the tripartite distinction of state, 
private, and foreign: national SOEs, provincial SOEs, local cooperatives, joint-stock companies, limited 
responsibility companies, sole proprietorships, foreign joint-ventures, and entirely foreign owned firms. The 1999 
Enterprise Law also legalized private partnerships, however this new enterprise form has not yet proven to be a 
popular option for entrepreneurs.   
SOEs while combining SOEs operating in strategic areas into business groups or conglomerates. These 
large groups enabled firms to take advantage of economies of scale previously denied under central 
planning and sometimes resulted in virtual monopolies in certain industries (Beresford & Fforde, 1996). It 
is important to note these state sector reforms were neither an attempt to loosen state claims over the 
ultimate control rights of state enterprises nor an attempt to reduce the economic activity of the state 
owned sector. In fact the Vietnamese government hoped to create a vibrant state sector to lead the 
national economy. After the restructuring of the state sector, the surviving SOEs, about 6500 total, 
constituted a large economic presence controlling 80% of the fixed assets in the economy and up to 90% 
of all technical workers (Tran, 1996). 
  In contrast to the large state firms, private firms, first deemed legal by the VII Party Congress in 
1991, are mostly small or medium sized enterprises in retail trade or other services. By the mid-1990s 
only 28% of industrial firms were privately owned (Vo, 96). This relatively small presence reflects the 
continuing difficulties the private sector faces such as burdensome registration procedures and, until 
recently, the inability to import or export without the aid of a state trading firm. Due to the difficulties 
private firms face in obtaining formal credit, since state and newly established private banks are 
unaccustomed to lending at the high levels of risk carried by de novo private firms, retained earnings are 
the main source of investment funds. Informal credit, which includes family loans, money lenders, and 
credit associations, is also extensively utilized. 
  The third main category of ownership, foreign owned and co-owned firms, encounter few of the 
difficulties faced by domestic de novo private firms, partly due to the fact that foreign firms typically 
enter into partnership with Vietnamese state firms.
5 However these joint ventures constitute a category of 
ownership distinct from state ownership since in these ventures the state party has little control over 
operations, with land typically being their main capital contribution to the venture. The foreign firm, 
which contributes the production technology and managerial staff, usually has control over production 
and marketing decisions. 
  The Vietnamese government’s attempts to insure a predominant role for the state sector, through 
market protection and the use of state credit, helped to maintain the state sector share in industrial 
production in spite of the rapid growth in the de novo private and especially the foreign invested sector. 
For example, as total industrial output increased 92% in real terms over the 1995-2000 period, the output 
in the foreign invested sector increased 181% and the de novo private sector output increased 74% (both 
de novo and foreign firms began from a very small base). The much larger state industrial sector managed 
to increase its output almost at the same rate as the de novo private sector - 59% - even though there are 
                                                 
5 The Law on Foreign Investment, passed in December 1987, allowed foreign direct investment (FDI) in the hopes 
to increase total investment as well as to facilitate the transfer of technologies and managerial skills.   
virtually no new entrants in the state sector and thousands of new entrants in the private sector (General 
Statistical Office, 2002). 
The figures quoted above are national, but the situation in Ho Chi Minh City Province (the 
province of analysis) is similar. In 1999, 48% of industrial output in Ho Chi Minh City province was 
attributable to state firms, 22% to domestic private firms, and 30% to foreign invested firms. The 
proportion of SOE to domestic private output has been constant over the 1995-2000 period, yet the 
overall share of both has fallen as the output of foreign invested firms has rapidly grown (Statistical 
Office of Ho Chi Minh City, 2000).
6 It is difficult to find a parallel for the relatively strong growth 
performance of Vietnamese SOEs in other transition economies. For example in China, which also gave 
state firms greater autonomy in production and finance decisions, total SOE output increased an average 
of 7.7% annually from 1978 to 1992 (Groves et al., 1995). In contrast other firm types, notably the newly 
established Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), developed much more rapidly so that the SOE 
share in industrial output decreased from 78% of the total industrial output in 1978 to 48% in 1992 
(Naughton, 1994). Privatized firms in Eastern Europe also grew substantially faster than state firms 
(Frydman et al., 1999). 
The relatively poor growth performance of Vietnam’s private firms in relation to private firms in 
other transition economies most likely reflects, in part, the constraints in entry and investment mentioned 
earlier. As one example of these constraints we note that throughout much of the 1990s an entrepreneur 
needed a letter of character reference from a local police official in order to establish and register a private 
firm. In addition to entry barriers, existing private firms had much less access to sources of formal credit 
than SOEs and were comparatively undercapitalized. The ratio of outstanding debt to total revenue in a 
1996 sample of Vietnamese firms stood at .46 for SOEs and .13 for private firms even though private firm 
managers stated that one of the greatest obstacles to growth is a lack of available credit (Friedman, 2003). 
SOEs typically borrowed from state banks while private firms were equally likely to borrow from friends, 
relatives, and other credit sources as they were from state banks. Foreign joint ventures had no such 
capital constraints since investment capital typically comes from the parent company able to raise funds 
on the international market. 
There are certainly other constraints that have limited the de novo private sector in Vietnam.
 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999a,b) document how Vietnamese private firms adapt their behaviors in 
absence of legal institutions that would enforce interfirm contracts and mediate potential disputes. These 
coping strategies impose greater costs on private firms than would otherwise arise in a non-opaque legal 
environment. When discussing private firms, subsequent analysis will always distinguish between 
                                                 
6 Foreign sector growth rates have reached as high as 65% per annum, albeit this growth originated from a very 
small base.   
domestic private and foreign joint-venture firms. The very different environments in which these firms 
operate should be kept in mind and the laggard performance and relative burdens of the domestic private 
sector should help inform the analysis of the survey data to follow. 
 
Data description 
 
  This study uses data from a matched survey of firms and workers in Ho Chi Minh City Province, 
a largely urban province that also includes some rural areas.
 7 The survey was conducted in the fall of 
2000 as a collaborative effort between the Ho Chi Minh City Institute of Economic Research and both the 
William Davidson Institute and the Population Studies Center at the University of Michigan. This joint 
study  focused on labor demand issues among industrial firms with at least ten employees. A total of 350 
firms operating in 1999 were surveyed. The sample was designed to be representative across both 
ownership forms and industries with respect to firm employment, but the relatively high number of SOEs, 
due to their large employment presence in the province, prompted a slight oversampling of private firms 
and foreign joint ventures.
8 The survey sought information on a variety of topics including firm history, 
finances, hiring practices, and wage policies. Relevant to subsequent analysis, retrospective annual data 
over the three year period 1997-99 was sought on the firm’s labor force size, labor force characteristics, 
and financial performance. The questionnaire was designed to be compatible with a similar survey of 400 
firms conducted in Ho Chi Minh City in 1997 (this earlier survey lacked a worker component). When 
relevant, the analysis will pool data from both firm surveys in order to maximize the degrees of freedom. 
  In addition to the firm level information, an average of 4.4 production workers were randomly 
selected and surveyed at each firm for a total of 1553 respondents. A greater number of workers were 
surveyed at larger firms to ensure greater representativeness of the worker sample. Information was 
sought along the dimensions of education, training, contract form, and employment history, as well as 
questions inquiring into the prevailing labor practices at the employing firm. Both the firm level and 
worker level data will be utilized where relevant. The next section presents the results of the empirical 
analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ho Chi Minh City is, perhaps, the most important economic region in Vietnam due to its large share of national 
output and trade. However it should be noted that Ho Chi Minh City is not representative of the country as a whole. 
Indeed there is a high prevalence of light (and hence relatively successful) industry in Ho Chi Minh City while, for 
example, there is a concentration of heavy industry in the Red River Delta regions surrounding Hanoi. 
8 Sampling weights were developed to enable representative analysis but, since all of the subsequent analysis entails 
contrasting the state with the private sector, these firm weights are not employed.   
IV. Analysis of Matched Firm and Worker Data 
 
  We turn now to the analysis of the Vietnamese data, bearing in mind the direction of empirical 
inquiry discussed in Section II. We begin with an overview of both the firm and worker data. We then 
turn (in order discussed) to discussions of internal firm practices, wage returns to human capital, firm 
training needs, and, finally, estimates of firm labor productivity. 
 
Summary firm and worker characteristics, including variation in wages 
 
  Table 1 presents certain firm level summary statistics in Panel A, and worker level information in 
Panel B, in order to impart greater context to the discussion of the results. Not surprisingly, given the 
history of transition, SOEs are substantially older than either domestic de novo firms or foreign joint 
ventures. The vast majority of SOEs were founded in the pre-transition period while most private and 
foreign firms were established in the mid 90s or later. SOE firms are relatively very large and employ 
many more workers than other firm types. For example, industrial SOEs employed an average of 575 
workers in 1999, almost three times the average labor force of private firms and fifty percent more than 
foreign joint ventures. SOEs also tend to be widely distributed across the broad industrial categories listed 
in the table while foreign invested firms tend to be concentrated in two industries- garments and textiles, 
and machinery and equipment (including electronic assembly). Private domestic firms are also somewhat 
concentrated in garments and textiles. 
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The survey data allow a partially disaggregate inspection of labor force composition, both for the 
total workforce, as well as separately for production workers. As expected, production workers are by far 
the most numerous group in the firm’s total labor force, constituting approximately 85% of the total 
employment in each of the three ownership categories. The labor force as a whole is 45% female. This 
proportion is slightly higher for foreign joint ventures, where 54% of the total labor force and 55% of 
direct production workers are female. This difference may be due to the high incidence of foreign joint 
ventures in the textile and garment industry where female representation in that labor force is high. The 
survey also sought educational and training background. From this information it is possible to classify 
workers as skilled or unskilled using the Vietnamese government worker classification system.
9 Using 
these definitions, the survey reveals the SOE workforce is substantially more skilled than de novo private 
firms but foreign joint-venture firms are most skilled of all. More than half (53%) of foreign sector 
production workers are skilled, compared to only 23% of workers in de novo private firms and 36% in 
SOEs. Clearly the firm’s overall skill level should be an important factor in determining firm level 
outcomes such as labor productivity levels. 
  The higher skill levels in the foreign sector surely partly explain the significantly higher levels of 
mean worker compensation observed in that sector. Another factor behind this difference in compensation 
is that the minimum wages are higher for foreign firms than for domestic. This mean measure is 
computed simply by dividing total firm labor compensation (i.e. salary, bonus payments, and other labor 
expenditures) by total firm labor force. The foreign sector production worker compensation is 25% higher 
than their state counterparts and nearly 70% greater than that for private sector workers.
10 Thus, in spite of 
the youth of foreign sector workers, which will be shown in Panel B, they are the most handsomely 
compensated. Private sector workers, the least skilled labor force on average, receive the lowest wages. 
Not only do domestic private workers receive lower wages, but they also receive fewer benefits. In 
particular private workers are much less likely to receive health insurance and future pension coverage. 
  Finally, the firm level data does not enable detailed measures of intra-firm wage distribution. 
However the surveys did record the maximum and minimum monthly salaries paid for several different 
workforce categories. The simple ratio of the maximum and minimum salaries, either for all workers or 
for production workers alone, does give a sense of the range of wages offered by the firm. The maximum 
                                                 
9 A skilled worker is defined as either: a) a university graduate, or higher, for non-production workers or b) a 
production worker with a training certificate or one that has attained level 4 or higher on a 7-point worker grade 
scale. 
10 If mean wages are higher in state firms than private firms, these higher wages may induce greater worker effort a 
la standard efficiency wage models. However higher than market wages can only deter shirking or reduced effort if 
accompanied with the threat of worker release. Traditionally, it is very difficult if not impossible for SOEs to fire 
workers. Thus any higher mean wages paid should not impact on worker effort through the mechanisms suggested 
by the efficiency wage model. This model, however, may be applicable in the foreign invested sector where threat of 
worker separation is real.   
- minimum salary ratio of 10.17 for foreign firms is much greater than either the state or private firm ratio 
while the private firm ratio of 4.42 is modestly higher than the ratio of 4.12 for state firms. Looking solely 
within the occupation of production worker, the maximum – minimum ratios are much more similar, as 
we might expect given the narrowing of occupation categories. Still, foreign firms exhibit the highest 
ratio of 2.43, compared with ratios of roughly 2.2 for both state and private firms. This limited evidence 
suggests that the wage variation, especially the cross-occupation wage variation, is greatest in the foreign 
owned firms while domestic private firms exhibited modestly more wage variation than state firms do. 
Although these findings are suggestive, the limited nature of the measure prevents us from drawing too 
firm a conclusion, however the worker level data can offer more precise measures of the wage variation 
within firms in each ownership sector. 
  Panel B of Table 1 reports relevant summary statistics from the worker level data. Some simple 
facts are readily apparent. State sector workers are approximately 4 years older than foreign sector 
workers and 3 years older than private workers. The older ages of the state workers are reflected in the 
higher levels of work experience and tenure, where state workers have approximately 3 additional years 
of both work experience and tenure then either of the other two worker categories. While the foreign 
workers tend to be younger, they are also have slightly higher levels of schooling with a mean of 11 years 
of formal schooling in comparison with the 10 years of both state and private sector workers. These 
findings echo those of Panel A, where the foreign sector workforce was also found to be the more skilled. 
  Also consistent with the firm level findings, foreign sector workers earn higher wages than state 
workers who, in turn, earn significantly more than private workers do. Foreign sector workers report 
monthly earnings of 1,000,000 Dong for 1999, compared with 960,000 Dong for state workers and 
860,000 Dong for private workers.
11 Bonus payments (which are typically given twice a year) are also 
largest in the foreign sector, although in contrast to wages, private workers report a slightly larger bonus 
than state workers.
12 
  Worker sorting can potentially be an important factor in interpreting the analytic results, and one 
measure of the importance of sorting is the degree of inter-firm and inter-sectoral worker mobility. The 
worker survey did seek information on worker experience at other firms and found the vast majority of 
workers in the sample have only worked for their current employing firm. This is especially true for the 
foreign sector workers where 78% of respondents report never having worked elsewhere. Even though 
private sector workers are younger than their state counterparts, a slightly greater proportion of private 
workers than state workers (38% to 34%) have worked in a previous setting. Among those workers who 
                                                 
11 In 1999, approximately 11,000 Dong equated one US dollar. 
12 The survey records contract type in terms of piece rate versus salary. Much of the theoretical incentive literature is 
concerned with the tradeoffs between piece rate and salary. However this concern is not relevant in this context 
since there is little variation in the incidence of piece rates across sectors – the rates are uniformly very low.   
have worked elsewhere, there appears to be a good deal of cross sectoral mobility in every direction. 
Roughly equal proportions of mobile workers currently in the state sector have previously worked at other 
firms in the state sector or the private sector. Almost a quarter of mobile state sector workers were self-
employed in the last job before their current state sector employment. Among private sector workers, the 
transition from private firm to private firm dominates other such transitions, although 20% of mobile 
workers entered from state firms and another 20% from self-employment. Few mobile workers originate 
from the foreign sector, presumably reflecting both the relatively recent presence of this sector and the 
relative desirability of foreign sector jobs. The data demonstrate some degree of worker mobility, 
certainly higher then that found by Boeri and Flynn (1999) for Eastern Europe, yet there is no clear 
prevailing direction of these worker flows either into or out of the state sector and the overall mobility 
rates still appear low. The potential impact of selection issues should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results, however the fact that the strong majority of workers remain in their sector of origin may serve 
to allay selection concerns. 
  Finally, in the last section of Table 1, the worker level data enable a more careful look at wage 
variation across sectors.
13 First reported are the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of the 
monthly wage. These figures have been rescaled to adjust for the differing sample sizes of each sector. 
The expected greater variation in wages for the private sector is clearly apparent in the foreign sector, 
which reports both the highest wage standard deviation and highest coefficient of variation. Interestingly, 
the next highest sectoral variation in wages is found among state workers, while private sector workers 
report the lowest degree of sectoral variation in wages. The important differences between the two 
categories of private ownership – foreign owned and domestic firms – mentioned earlier is quite clear 
here. While foreign firms behave as expected, domestic private firms clearly do not. 
  The last few rows of Panel B distinguish between variation in wages that can be attributed to 
worker observables, such as education and experience, and residual wage variation. We accomplish this 
decomposition by predicting wages from a simple regression of worker salary on standard wage 
regression covariates such as education, experience, worker gender, marital status, and firm industry. We 
then estimate the variation of both these predicted wages as well as of the wage residual. In both cases, 
the variation for foreign sector workers is the greatest of the three sectors. This suggests that not only do 
foreign sector wages vary the most across relevant human capital and background variables, but even 
after controlling for the influence of such variables the wage variation is greatest in the foreign owned 
                                                 
13 Ideally we would like to look at wage variation within firms as opposed to within sectors, however the small 
number of worker observations per firm prevents us from doing so. However the sectoral differences in wage 
variation reported below are significantly different from each other even after controlling for firm industry, size, and 
age.   
sector. Once again, and contrary to expectations, the wage variation for both the predicted wage and the 
wage residual is smallest in the domestic private sector. 
 
Internal labor practices 
 
  Given that wage variation between workers in the state and foreign sector behave as expected 
(although this is not the case for domestic private firms) we may expect to observe important differences 
in firm labor practices along the lines discussed in Section II. The survey data does shed some light on 
various firm labor policies such as wage determination and job promotion and this policy relevant 
information is summarized in Table 2. Questions were posed to each firm regarding the most important 
criteria used by the firm when establishing a worker’s starting wage and when deciding on a wage 
increase. Even though state firms are no longer constrained by law to the state mandated wage schedules, 
the influence of such schedules is still apparent in the responses. For determining starting wages, SOEs 
were most likely to report either the state wage schedule or the legal minimum wage. Since the two 
categories are essentially equivalent in wage levels, we have combined them for the purposes of Table 2. 
Even by the year 2000, several years into the Vietnamese transition, SOEs still report the influence of 
state wage schedules in setting firm labor policies. For private firms, the legal minimum is the most 
prevalent criteria, although a substantial portion of private firms also list other market driven factors such 
as the prevailing market wage and the expected efficacy of the new hire. Foreign firms overwhelmingly 
list the legal minimum wage as the most important wage setting criteria for new hires. This finding is not 
unexpected as by law a higher minimum wage applies to foreign firms than to domestic firms that almost
 always binds for new hires. 
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In terms of determining wage increases for workers with some tenure at the firm, all three firm 
types consistently list worker characteristics (such as education and experience) as the most important 
criteria. Interestingly, the next most commonly listed criteria differ across the firm classifications. State 
firms next most commonly list the state wage schedules as the guiding criteria, while domestic private 
firms list worker efficacy and foreign firms list the prevailing market wage. Both worker efficacy and the 
prevailing market wage are not unexpected criteria to have listed by private firms operating in a 
competitive labor market. The influence of state wage schedules in SOE wage determination is striking 
since their use is no longer mandated by law. 
  Certain firm labor practices can also be gleaned from the worker level data. Most notably, 
workers were asked to give the determinant of job promotion that they perceive to be the most important 
to their advancement. In a firm environment where individual worker productivity determines 
advancement, worker effort should be a commonly listed determinant of job promotion. Work effort is 
indeed the most important element listed by workers at all three firm types, with about half of workers at 
state and domestic private firms claiming that effort will be the most important determinant of 
advancement. A substantially greater number of foreign sector workers (72%) list effort as the most 
important element of promotion, thus suggesting a salient difference in the practices of Vietnamese and 
foreign owned firms. In contrast firms that may promote workers solely with regard to seniority, and 
without regard to work performance, are likely to have a less efficient allocation of workers across 
positions within the firms. These seniority based promotion rules are quite evocative of pre-transition 
SOE practices and, not unexpectedly, a substantial minority, 23%, of state sector workers list firm tenure 
as the most important determinant of job promotion. Somewhat surprisingly, domestic private workers are 
also next most likely to list tenure as the important criteria (20% of private sector workers choose this 
criteria), while only 8% of foreign sector workers list tenure as a relevant criteria. 
  Another factor through which we may measure the relative emphasis firms place on worker skill 
or effort is the typical time a worker is expected to need to learn how to satisfactorily execute a particular 
job. In firms where individual workers are expected to produce, and will be evaluated on their 
productivity, managers may expect to observe rapid improvement and workers may expend much effort 
to meet those expectations. In the same occupations, and in firms that de-emphasize individual 
productivity, managers may not impart the same high expectations, and workers may move along the 
learning curve at a more leisurely pace. These differing work environments are indeed suggested by the 
survey data. Workers were asked to estimate the time a typical worker needs in order to do their particular 
job well, and the reported mean amount of time was corrected for differences in the distribution of firms 
across industries. Foreign sector workers report the shortest time span, only 177 days, while state sector   
workers report needing the longest amount of time, 286 days. Private sector workers were somewhere in 
the middle reporting a necessary time span of 225 days.
14 
  These three aspects of labor practices discussed imply some salient differences across firms of 
different ownership forms. State firms still report a reliance on state wage schedules for wage 
determination while private firms, both foreign and domestic, report criteria that reflect worker efficacy or 
prevailing market practices. Foreign workers are also more likely to view their own effort as the most 
important determinant of job promotion, while a substantial minority of state and private domestic 
workers list tenure as the most important determinant. The relative similarity in the determinants of job 
promotion between Vietnamese private and state firms may indicate human resource management 
practices that managers in both firm types share. Indeed, many private managers once worked in the state 
sector (Friedman, 2003). Lastly, the expectation for new workers to learn rapidly on the job appears to be 
highest for workers in the foreign sector, and much lower for state workers. 
  The next section explores how these differences in practice translate into differences in worker 
compensation for standard human capital measures such as education and experience. 
 
Estimated returns to education and experience 
 
  The discussion in Section II predicts workers in firms that offer contracts over a wide wage range 
will face steeper wage – experience profiles. In addition, if educational attainment and subsequent on-the-
job learning are complements, then the returns to formal education should also be higher for workers in 
such firms. We now investigate this prediction with empirical estimates of the returns to various human 
capital measures. Utilizing the worker level data, we adopt a standard Mincerian wage regression of the 
following form: 
 
i i i i i i X X E W ε β β β β + + + + + = D β4
2
3 2 1 0 ln  
 
Our dependent variable is the log of the monthly wage and we assess formal education, E, with both 
continuous and discrete measures. Also included in the regression is a vector D of industry dummy 
variables as well as binary measures of worker gender and marital status. Our experience measure, X, is a 
direct measure of total years worked. The coefficients of interest will be identified by the within sector 
co-variation of the dependent variable and the controls. Since workers were surveyed at their firm site, the 
reported standard errors are Huber-White corrected for cluster effects. 
                                                 
14 These sectoral differences in the estimated time required to learn on the job are significantly different from each 
other even after we control for firm industry, size, and age.   
  The first panel of Table 3 presents the results of the wage regression using years of total 
education as the education measure. Certain intersectoral differences are readily apparent. First and 
foremost, the estimated return to formal education, while positive and statistically significant among the 
private and foreign sector workforce, is statistically indistinguishable from zero for state sector workers. 
(The estimates are also not statistically different from each other due to the relatively small sample sizes.) 
The overall finding that the returns to education are lower for state sector workers is unsurprising given 
other studies on educational returns in Vietnam (World Bank, 1996) however a finding of zero returns is a 
bit striking.
15 Nevertheless the overall result that education returns are lower in the state sector is in 
consistent with the discussion in Section II as well as that state wage schedules compress wage returns to 
education.
                                                 
15 A re-estimation of the state sector wage equation without industrial dummies does find a positive and significant 
return to years of schooling. This suggests that state sector workers with high formal education are sorted into high 
wage industries.   
Table 3. Estimated returns to education and experience
a, worker level data
SOEs Private (domestic) Foreign jont-venture
Continuous measure of education
Years of education 0.0064 0.0285 0.0352
0.0079 0.0075 0.0143
Years of experience 0.0294 0.0249 0.0348
0.0081 0.0082 0.0148
Experience squared -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005
0.0003 0.0003 0.0006
Unweighted N 581 665 288
Discrete measure of education
b
Post-secondary training 0.1100 0.1993 0.4779
0.0550 0.0543 0.1120
Secondary school graduate 0.0381 0.1023 0.0800
0.0358 0.0383 0.0324
Experience 0.0303 0.0226 0.0314
0.0082 0.0081 0.0132
Experience squared -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005
0.0003 0.0003 0.0006
Unweighted N 581 665 288
Measure of technical capability
c
Technical level ranking 0.0155 0.0809 0.0588
0.0186 0.0261 0.0289
Experience 0.0228 0.0042 0.0225
0.0130 0.0079 0.0133
Experience squared -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.0004 0.0002 0.0006
Unweighted N 241 310 173
Source: 2000 Ho Chi Minh City Firm and Worker Survey
b Excluded education category is primary school graduate or less.
c Technical levels vary along a 7 point official scale.
a The dependent variable is log monthly wage ('000 Dong). Besides education and experience 
measures, regressions include marital status, sex of worker and industry dummies. Huber-White 
standard errors corrected for cluster effects (since workers are surveyed at sample firms) are reported 
below the estimated coefficients.
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As opposed to the education returns, state sector returns to experience are positive and precisely 
estimated. The point estimates of the experience coefficients are also greater than those estimated for the 
domestic private sector. This finding runs contrary to the theoretical expectations but is consistent with 
the general findings regarding the private sector, i.e. little observable difference in labor practices and 
outcomes between Vietnamese state and private firms. What is consistent with expectations is that the 
estimated returns to experience are highest in the foreign sector thus implying that foreign sector workers 
face the steepest wage - experience profiles. Figure 1 projects these parameterized returns to experience 
into wage-experience profiles for each of the three sectors. The estimated profile is steepest for foreign 
firms, followed by state firms, while the flattest profile is reserved for domestic private firms. 
Unfortunately there are not enough observations to estimate and compare the range of wages offered by 
years of worker experience, which would be another direction of inquiry as suggested in Section II. In 
contrast to the foreign - state firm comparison, the wage – experience profiles for the private domestic 
firms are contrary to expectations. This is yet another result suggesting that the internal labor practices of 
the domestic private sector do not align with overall expectations. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
The bottom two panels of Table 3 report wage regressions with alternative measures of education. The 
middle panel employs a discrete measure of education, where attainment is separated into three 
categories: workers with post-secondary training, workers who have only graduated from secondary 
school, and primary school graduates or less. The findings here reflect the earlier findings in the top panel, 
where the returns to education are greatest in the foreign sector (a foreign sector worker with post-
secondary training earns approximately 50% more than a primary school graduate). The next highest 
returns are found in the private sector. The state sector still exhibits the lowest returns to education, 
although the returns to state workers with post-secondary training are now significantly different from 
primary school graduates at standard significance levels. With regards to the estimated returns to 
experience, when formal education is measured in discrete terms the estimated returns to experience are 
somewhat modified resulting in more similar estimates between the state and the foreign sector. 
  Workers in certain occupations are assigned a technical skill level that varies along an official 
seven point scale. This scale is adopted as the final human capital measure. Approximately half of the 
worker sample is in occupations with such a scale, so the sample sizes for these regressions are 
substantially less than those reported above. Consistent with the top two panels in the table, private sector 
returns are estimated to be substantially larger than state sector returns. Although now in a reversal, the 
returns to technical capability are greater in the private domestic sector than in the foreign sector. Once 
again the returns to technical capability are lowest in the state sector and statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. 
 
Formal worker training 
 
  The results presented in the previous section suggest that foreign firms present their workers with 
greater incentives for informal learning by offering a steeper wage - experience profile and rewarding 
formal education to a greater degree than state firms. Private domestic firms find themselves in a hybrid 
position by also rewarding formal education but not rewarding experience to as large a degree. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, firms can compensate for the lack of informal learning incentives 
by actively training workers themselves. Table 4 explores the extent to which firms of different ownership 
form feel they need formal training as well as the extent to which formal training occurs. Both the firm 
and the worker surveys contained sections devoted to various aspects of training, and results from both
 sources are reported.  
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Panel A of Table 4 presents the reported mean training needs for firms in the three ownership 
categories. There are two measures of need, the first is the firm assessed percentage of workers in need of 
training (either retraining or additional new training) by five worker categories. The second measure of 
need is the estimated mean duration of such necessary training. In general, state firms report the greatest 
need for training as assessed by both need measures. In the direct production worker category, the largest 
workforce category, state firms report that 38% of the workforce needs further training, compared with 
29% in the foreign sector and 25% in the private sector. State firms also believe that their direct 
production workers require the most amount of time spent in training, with an average of five and a half 
months compared to four months for private sector direct production workers and three and half months 
for foreign sector workers. While the sectoral distinctions are most clear for direct production workers, 
the general story is consistent across the other worker categories: perceived training needs are greater in 
the state sector than in either category of private ownership. Among privately owned firms, when training 
need is measured by percent of workforce in need of training, it appears that foreign firms are in greater 
need of training. However the time of training measure generally yields the opposite conclusion, i.e. 
domestic private firms suffer in relative terms from an under trained workforce. 
  The worker level data is able to shed some light on the incidence of individual training across 
firm types as the worker surveys seek formal training histories at the current firm of employ. In terms of 
overall incidence, state and foreign sector workers report roughly equal incidences of formal training – 
23% of workers in both sectors report such training, although the formal training experience is more 
recent for foreign sector workers.
16 Presumably, this recency in part reflects the simple fact that foreign 
sector workers are younger and thus “at risk” for training over a shorter time span. Private sector workers 
report the lowest incidence of formal training (only 17% of the workforce). This result reflects both the 
fact that, apparently, private firms do not assess their training needs as particularly high, and private firms 
may also lack the means in relation to state and foreign firms to institute formal training programs. 
  Worker training is most likely to take place at the firm, although a substantial minority of state 
workers train directly at a government training institute or a vocational/technical school. This difference 
may partly be due to differing sources of funding for such training. Recall that in the discussion in Section 
II, state firms can receive state transfers in return for their less than optimal labor policies, and these 
transfers can be spent on formal training to partly compensate for the lower wage incentives imposed by 
the state. The worker data is utilized to explore this prediction since it asks each recipient of training to 
identify the source of training funds. The majority of workers in all three sectors claim to have the 
training funded directly by the employing firm. However a substantial minority of state sector workers 
(29%) have the training costs paid directly by the government, suggesting that state firms have a greater 
                                                 
16 Unfortunately the survey is unable to shed light on the quality of formal training.   
array of financing options for worker training than either type of private firm. That private firms in 
particular lack the means for formal training may be suggested by the fact that private sector workers 
contain the largest proportion of workers (9%) across all three firm categories to fund their own training. 
  The last row of Table 4 reports the mean wage sensitivity to training programs for each of the 
three ownership categories. The conjecture here is that for firms where formal training is a more 
important mechanism of human capital acquisition, the wage response to training should be greater. Since 
wage increases also provide informal incentives for on-the-job learning, firms that already provide such 
informal incentives have less need to provide wage incentives for formal training. As is becoming the 
standard pattern in this paper, these predictions hold when comparing the state with the foreign sector. 
Workers in the state sector, where fewer informal incentives are provided, report a mean wage gain of 7% 
after formal training whereas foreign sector workers report a gain of only 4.5%. Domestic private firms, 
once again, present another pattern. Private sector workers report the highest wage gains of all (8.5%). 
  Certain generalizations are now becoming clear. The theoretical predictions for internal labor 
practices of firms of different ownership forms – i.e. that private firms exhibit greater wage variation, 
state firm practices are influenced by the legacy of state wage schedules, wage – experience profiles are 
steeper for private sector workers, and formal training needs as well as the means to satisfy those needs 
are greater in state firms – fit the data quite well when comparing foreign and state owned firms.
17 
Domestic private firms are more of an enigma, exhibiting some features in line with expectations and 
some quite contrary to them. The final discussion point in Section II hypothesizes that, since private firms 
are more likely to offer efficient incentives to workers, they should also exhibit higher levels of labor 
productivity. Thus we would expect to observe greater labor efficiency among foreign firms than state 
firms. The relative productivity of private domestic firms is more difficult to predict given the findings up 
till this point. 
 
Firm labor productivity 
 
  This final subsection estimates the mean labor productivity of firms of different ownership forms. 
Controlling for relevant covariates, we predict that firms that create a work environment with greater 
incentives for learning and effort should exhibit significantly higher levels of labor productivity. Given 
that foreign firms exhibit the highest degree of sectoral wage variation, the highest returns to both 
                                                 
17 The data also contain some information on the quality of informal learning on the job. Workers in the foreign 
invested sector are much more likely to report lessons from supervisors as the most important source of 
improvement in skills (other options include learning through observation and on-the-job practice) [results not 
shown]. As argued by Lowenstein and Spletzer (1999) supervisor-given lessons are the most effective form of 
informal training, thus perhaps suggesting that foreign firms are more attentive to the informal training needs of 
their workforce.   
education and experience, promotion policies that most emphasize worker effort, and the least reported 
need for formal training, we would predict foreign firms to exhibit the highest levels of worker 
productivity. Predicting the relative labor productivities for state and domestic private worker firms is a 
more difficult task since at different points in the analysis either firm type exhibits behavior that is more 
consistent with the theoretical expectations. State sector workers report greater wage variation, even after 
controlling for relevant observables, while private sector workers face higher returns to education, yet 
lower returns to experience. Because of these ambiguities, we refrain from making predictions regarding 
the relative labor productivities of domestic firms. We should note at the outset, however, that firms very 
across numerous dimensions and only some of these dimensions are observed in the data. Other 
characteristics possibly related to labor productivity, such as quality of production technology or 
managerial ability, are unobserved. Thus the analysis will be able to estimate sectoral differences in labor 
productivity but not able to ascribe such differences to labor practices to the exclusion explanations 
related to unobserved characteristics. 
  The specification of labor productivity derives from a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function where the unit of analysis is a firm-year observation. Total output Yit is a function of labor inputs, 
Lit, and capital inputs Kit: 
 
γ α
it it it K AL Y =  
 
Dividing all factors in the above equation by Lit, and then converting the expression to log form results in 
the following: 
 
it it it it it LogL L K Log LogA L Y Log ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( − + + + = γ α γ  
 
We will estimate an extended version of the above specification that also allows for sector specific 
intercepts and other firm characteristics believed to affect labor productivity. In particular we estimate: 
 
it it s it a it l it k i own it s a l k own y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + + = it DD β 0  
 
where yit is the log measure of firm labor productivity for firm i in year t. To ensure the robustness of any 
findings, four different productivity measures are used in the analysis - revenue per worker, value added 
per worker, revenue per production worker, and value added per production worker. The ownership 
variable, owni, is a tripartite categorical variable covering the familiar ownership categories of state,   
domestic private, and foreign joint-ventures. State firms constitute the excluded category. Four relevant 
control variables are measured in log values and enter as linear terms – the book value of firm capital per 
worker, kit, total firm labor size, lit, the age of the firm, ait, and the proportion of the work force deemed 
skilled based on observable information, sit.
18 The vector D contains various other control variables such 
as dummy variables for industry and year of observation as well as categorical measures of firm market 
power (based on the number of firm competitors in the primary product market) and the importance of 
exports in total revenue. The productivity regressions are estimated on the pooled sample of firm 
information incorporating the firm level information from the 1997 survey along with the firm data from 
the 2000 survey. In order to reduce the influence of extreme outliers, an iterative process that minimizes 
first Huber weights and then bi-weights was utilized. In addition, since each firm contributes more than 
one observation, standard errors were Huber-White corrected for cluster effects. 
  The first vertical panel of Table 5 reports various regression specifications with labor productivity 
proxied by revenue per worker. The initial regression controls only for the firm capital to labor ratio, total 
labor, age, industry, and year of observation. We find, somewhat surprisingly, that revenue per worker is 
significantly lower in both the domestic and foreign private sectors than in state firms. Thus once we 
control for firm size and capital per worker, state firms earn more income per worker than other firm 
types. As expected, capital per worker has a large and significant impact on labor productivity, as does 
firm age- the older the firm the higher the revenue per worker. Firm size itself may have a positive 
influence on revenue per worker although this coefficient is not precisely estimated.
                                                 
18 Following Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we also experimented with a semi-parametric 
specification where firm capital, age, and worker skill level were specified as a fourth order polynomial. Since the 
ownership coefficients were not substantially changed in this specification, we only report results with the simpler 
linear terms.  
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When we control for the observed overall skill level of the firm labor force, we see that the 
proportion of skilled labor force itself does have a large and significant impact on labor productivity, 
verifying that our measure of aggregate firm labor skill is indeed a meaningful measure. However the 
coefficients for ownership form are unchanged. The third specification also controls for market structure 
and export revenue. When these controls are included the revenue per worker among foreign firms is no 
longer significantly different than that for state firms. Private firms still exhibit labor productivity levels 
statistically indistinguishable from state firms. This change in the results for foreign firms arises because 
foreign owned firms are concentrated in markets that have many competitors. State firms with few or no 
competitors presumably earn higher rents per worker and these higher rents obscure the labor productivity 
measures by inflating revenue per worker. Once we control for market structure we can more precisely 
compare relative labor productivity. 
  The second vertical panel in Table 5 reports the same sequence of regression specifications, only 
this time using worker value added as the productivity measure. Value added is typically seen as a more 
desirable measure of labor productivity since it controls for cross-firm variation in expenditures for raw 
materials; these expenditures are generally expected to be uncorrelated with true firm productivity. 
Similar to the first panel, estimates of domestic private firm labor productivity are significantly lower than 
those for state firms in each of the three regression specifications although the estimated difference is 
somewhat attenuated in comparison with the revenue per worker estimates. However with the value 
added measure of productivity, foreign firms are either estimated to have the same productivity levels as 
state firms or, when market structure is controlled for, foreign firms are estimated to attain labor 
productivity levels 15% greater than state firms. Apparently state firms with high levels of revenue per 
worker also have large expenditures for raw materials and energy. Once these input expenditures are 
netted out, then a  labor productivity advantage in foreign firms emerges, as expected given the previous 
discussion. The coefficient for the capital to worker ratios are somewhat attenuated in relation to the 
revenue per worker estimates, as would occur if material inputs are correlated with firm capital stock, and 
the coefficient for firm size actually increases. The estimated influence of firm age and labor force skill 
are largely unchanged from before. 
  The same essential story is observed in the last two panels of Table 5, where labor productivity is 
now measured by revenue or value added per production worker. In all specifications, domestic private 
sector labor productivity is significantly lower then that estimated for state firms while labor productivity 
in the foreign sector is either lower, the same, or higher, than the state sector depending on the 
productivity measure and specification. The fullest specification with the value added measure of labor 
productivity suggests that foreign firms exhibit productivity levels 19% higher than state firms while the 
level for private firms are 20% lower in relation to state firms.   
  The finding that foreign sector labor productivity is higher than that in the state sector is certainly 
consistent with the notion that foreign sector internal labor practices and wage policies promote greater 
worker effort and worker skill acquisition. Of course other unobserved firm characteristics such as 
differential technology and managerial ability can also contribute to this finding. Future work and data 
collection efforts will hopefully be able to further distinguish among the possibilities that this current 
study suggests are important. In a similar vein, the findings that domestic private firms have lower labor 
productivity than the state sector is consistent with some of the other empirical findings, namely that 
Vietnamese de novo private firms offer a flatter wage tenure profile than state firms and actually exhibit 
the smallest within sector wage dispersion. However, as suggested earlier, Vietnamese private firms in the 
1995-2000 period operated under comparatively severe constraints in terms of poor access to formal 
credit, barriers to market entry, and an insecure regulatory environment. These constraints, in addition to 
the observed internal labor practices and wage policies, would also contribute to the relative 
underperformance of the private sector. 
 
Conclusions 
 
  This paper is concerned with the consequences of the compressed wage structure of the state 
owned sector, a relatively under-investigated aspect in many transition economies. This topic is a specific 
example of how political influences affect internal firm policies which, in turn, may affect work force 
incentives. In this instance, the compressed wage structure affects worker incentives for work effort and 
skill acquisition. There are two consequences of these weak labor incentives in the state sector. The first 
is low worker effort that leads to low within period productivity profit. The second is less investment in 
human capital that leads to lower future productivity and lower future profit. This dynamic effect of 
political intervention in firm policy can thus have negative ramifications for the entire transition economy 
since it can restrict learning and skill acquisition for a substantial portion of the labor force. There may 
even be further consequences from such inefficient policies if new production technologies and worker 
skill levels are complementary. In this case the low skill levels of the state work force give SOEs fewer 
incentives to innovate. 
  We discussed the human capital consequences of a compressed within firm wage structure and 
then explored a number of empirical implications with recent matched firm and worker data from 
Vietnam. As expected, Vietnamese state firms exhibit compressed wage distributions in relation to 
foreign owned firms. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies 
result in flatter wage – experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in 
greater need for formal training, a need that is, in part, met through direct government financing. In spite   
of the opportunities for government financed training, state firms exhibit significantly lower levels of 
labor productivity as determined by a full regression specification with value added per worker as the 
measure of labor productivity.
19 The counterpart to state firms for all of these comparisons are foreign 
invested joint ventures. These foreign firms behave in relative terms as expected. This is not the case for 
Vietnamese private firms that, at least in the aggregate, exhibit much more idiosyncratic behavior. The 
exact reasons for the unique position of Vietnamese private firms remain a topic of ongoing research, yet 
we conjecture that constraints, in terms of poor access to formal credit, barriers to entry, and an uncertain 
regulatory environment play an important role in addition to private firms internal labor practices and 
wage policies. 
                                                 
19 We should note that two caveats are in order. First, the data does not contain information on unobserved worker 
quality or ability and, as discussed previously, possible worker selection makes it more difficult to interpret certain 
findings as resulting solely from the influence of within firm incentives. Second, the data does not contain 
information on the firm’s quality of production technology or managerial ability, which can vary across firms of 
different ownership form and perhaps even within the same industry and among firms with the same age and capital 
stock. Potential differences in production technology or managerial ability can also contribute to some of the 
empirical findings. Future work, including additional data collection efforts, is needed to address these issues.   
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